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Copyright Steven J Collier March 2003 - May be quoted and reprinted as long as clear acknowledgment given and we are notified

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Bit 8 Fri 11 April 2003

 

Bit 7 - Wed 2 April 2003
INTO APRIL: from farce to deadly signs. Honour in war. Something about supply. Something about Ali.

"We are sending a mighty force...We will not relent. We will not stop"
--Bush speaking near some soldiers yesterday.

A hard and angry edge to the President's voice, but something childish too. If he were a bigger man, the words would have sounded biblical. It's nearly beyond doubt that they were actually intended to - in tune with earlier rhetoric describing a certain lifestyle as a gift from God to everyone: and putting 'mighty force' + 'repent' into google doesn't fetch Bush's latest speech yet -- it fetches American bible-study pages, Republican party sites, and little else. The effects of such words from Bush's mouth were not Mosaic -- delivered as they were they gave the impression that this war is the kindergarten of the President's soul.

I`m not the only person to have noticed:

--German President Johannes Rau has sharply criticized the religious justification for the war used by President George W. Bush. Rau said no society had recieved a divine omen to liberate another, adding such a belief was a misaprehension. Rau said the war in Iraq was reminiscent of World War II and he did not understand US justifications. From Deutsche Welle:
http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1429_W_821968,00.html

Rau offers a stark alternative that is designed to shock, that must shock: between a global war and a real apocalypse if the conflict cannot be abated. He does not ask to choose between these alternatives.

And we can choose neither. We have to work on ways for Australia to step out of this conflagration while we are still on it's periphery and doing well (in a military sense). Once we have a military failure -- troops killed or prisoner -- honour makes it hard to walk away. Honour is the great trap in war, no less for the dishonourable leader craving it than for the warrior upholding it; no less than it is for the civilian who sees it as the moral fulcrum of ambiguous conflicts. Or than it is for the opinion-makers who use it to snare hearts and shut minds.

But honour has a real ambit: places or situations of adversity. A foxhole, a dark alley, an insult, a death in the family.
To show honour in it's right place is fine, but to seek places where you might find it is madness -- unless you have none. Neither do we send young men and women to places of danger in order that they may find honour -- unless we think that they have none. We will not dishonour our troops by calling for them to be withdrawn from such an ambiguous and dangerous war: we merely dishonour the leaders who sent them to it. And our leaders will live through that experience.

SUPPLY LINES
How long are the American lines of supply in this war? 400km from Kuwait to Karbala?
Yes, from the beach head ports: add 15,000km of sea routes to that.
Cross the Atlantic to Gibraltar. Then: the Mediterranean with the Arab coast of North Africa on one side. Through Suez then the Red Sea with Arab coasts on both sides, then the narrows of Bab al Mandab. Up the south coast of the Arabian Peninsula, then through the Arabian Sea, the straits of Hormuz with Iran visible from the ship's bridge - and finally the length of the Persian Gulf with muslim nations two-deep on all sides.

It's one of the longest sea routes in the world - if war spreads it will be the most dangerous. Incidents of conflict at some level is almost guaranteed as US transports and their escorts avoid or warn-off small Arab vessels. It`s only a matter of time before another diplomatic crisis -- or worse -- arises over the conduct of shipping on this route. Should widespread conflict occur, the route will be unusable without strong escorts.

Iraqi miltary supply lines are clandestine and intermittent, except for the roads from Syria to Mosul. Nearly all of Iraq`s fighting capacity comes from stockpiles already in place: coalition forces have discovered several large ones already, so there must be many more. Reinforcements for Iraq are coming from Syria: 6000 volunteer fighters arrived in Mosul yesterday, apparently unchallenged by coalition or Kurdish forces. Iraq still controls the road south from Mosul to Baghdad, so there is nothing but air strikes to stop them reaching the battlefields. With help from Syria, Iraq has a good chance of keeping the roads into Mosul under control for a long time.

Roads between Jordan and Baghdad are now too dangerous for Iraqis to use -- open country with coalition special forces calling air strikes on any traffic they see, and in the last few days armoured reconnaisance and helicopter units from US forces near Karbala can easily intercept traffic west of Baghdad. Traffic on this road is being bombed mercilessly. Ar Ramadi or Al Fallujah may be the next objective for US ground forces: if they take either town they cut the road to Jordan and the southern road to Syria.

The Iranian border seems quiet after the Ansar al Islam battle (an Afghanistan-style easy victory for coalition), but it's worth noting that no large ground force has gone very far up the Tigris road yet. It's swampy land and very close to the Iran border: Iraqi and Iranian soldiers both know it well from the 1980-88 war. It`s a fair bet that this region will be a major smuggling route for supplies to Iraqi Shia fighters as Saddam`s government becomes weaker -- at the moment, Baghdad does not want to give Iran any major IOU.

NAJAF AND KARBALA - Something about Ali. A journalist's tale.
Najaf and Karbala are both now under siege by US infantry. They're the two holy Shia cities (worldwide: this is no Iraqi shibboleth). Sensitive advice to SPECTRE gunship pilots includes orders not to strafe the tombs of Ali and Huseyn.

For what might be in store for these towns, read one of the first real dispatches from the war by Mark Franchettti of the UK Sunday Times: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-628288,00.html

mirrored for non-subscribers at:
http://www.rense.com/general36/turnfire.htm

Bit 6 - Sun 30 March 2003
BLOGGED DOWN ON THE ROAD TO BAGHDAD: Strategy evaporates.

American ground commanders request an operational pause to the Baghdad push: a convenient 'end of part one' for the histories of this war. This doesn`t mean the ground fighting near Karbala Najaf and Nasariyah will stop, though - it may even intensify during the pause: if the Iraqis think the American V corps spearhead is tired and hungry they are unlikely to stop attacking it or harassing it`s supply. The US Euphrates over-stretch is as bad as it`s going to be (at least, I hope it is) and the Iraqis will make merry with it until it either shortens or reinforces significantly.

The War planners in Washington have made three fairly big blunders which coalition troops should survive, but which mission plans and uncountable non-combatants may not. Two of the three are (roughly) numerically proveable, and the third should be just
about obvious if you look at a map of where troops are now.

FIRST: -- Rushing in regardless when Turkey withdrew transit/basing rights.
Invasion force starts with 2 divisions, 2 major airbases and 70% of planned approach routes back in the can. 2 divisions: because 101 airborne was going in with 4 mechanized -- ground troops to sieze airfields and airmobile troops to fly in and operate from them. 101 airborne, a quick mover, is now coming into the fight from the
south. 4 mechanized is still 2-3 weeks away from the fighting. Loss of approach routes was even more significant than the delayed troops - Iraqis were able to ignore any threat north of Baghdad (and can continue to do so for another week or two). Iraqis therefore still have a treatening mobile reserve of several divisions that have been driving round the southern battlefields, avoiding US armoured concentrations, reinforcing weak points -- and still theoretically threatening the origin of coalition operations in Kuwait. Approximate force-multiplier effect for Iraqis here: multiply by 1.7

SECOND: -- getting the enemy numbers wrong
This is a big one. Rumsfeld`s assumptions of Shia rebellion and Regular Army defection/inaction have both been wrong so far. Planning assumed that about 450,000 Republican Guard, regular army and fedayeen forces would suffer serious atrittion due to coalition proximity, surrenders, coalition threats blandishments and guarantees, infighting; and diversion to supressing or deterringrebellions. 450,000 were likely assumed to be down to 250,000 and nervous by this far into the campaign. Multiplier effect for Iraqis: let`s say 1.8 Misreading the reaction of Shias adds at least a million fighting men to the Iraqi side -- possibly as many as four million. Shias should now be expected to resist generally with or without direction from the governement in Baghdad. The only good news here is that there will probably be more willing fighters than availible guns. Multiplier effect for Iraqis, let`s call it 3. We`re up to 9.18 already, without discussing the multiplier effect of the defensive tactics which coalition commentators have recently come to respect.

THIRD: -- Not changing the southern approach plan.
American forces on the Euphrates roads are halted among the Shia towns south of Baghdad: too many towns to take and too many to ignore. Another American group is fighting toward al Kut on the Tigris (which is the approach that the whole of V corps except some blocking forces should have taken -- turn left at al Kut and there`s Baghdad), and most of the British are around Basra. Three powerful but widely seperated groups that are incapable of supporting each other, and stuck where they are because of politics. if Whitehouse and CENTCOM can`t admit that forces need to pause during an advance, they certainly can`t authorize a redeployment that will be seen as a retreat. Army Group Euphrates is doomed to fight forward divided, guard two
roads rather than the one they need, and leave nearly every major town south of Baghdad unsecured on roads to their rear.Even if both groups manage to fight forward to Bagdad with air support and reinforcement, they`re probably not going to arrive at
the city at the same time -- and that`s another source of danger so obvious that I won`t go into it.

So what now? Hard to predict far: I`ll take a punt and say that the Iraqis have had the military initiative for five days and will have it for about another 2 to 4 weeks -- but they will be extremely lucky to do anything fatally damaging with it. The threat to the troops from Washington is potentially far worse and lasts much longer. If Rumsfeld tells Franks to order any major advance toward Baghdad on the Euphrates in the next week, there is potential for disaster: regimental-scale losses of armour and thousands of Americans prisoner -- no control of the ground and no local intelligence. I`ve already seen 100% photoanalytic-genuine video of burning and unrecovered Abrams tanks in palm groves near Karbala; (you`re going to ask, so: via BBC monitoring of Abu Dhabi TV), and a unit that cannot recover it`s own destroyed vehicles does not 'control the battlespace'. A more general problem: coalition troops are now fighting without objectives because there has been a collapse of strategy .Objectives have suddenly become purely tactical... it`s going to be a long war.

Bit 5 - Thurs 27 March 2003
UNSTRUCTURED NOTES - the last two days.
Battlefield predictions that will be obsolete by the time you read them:
Saddam`s getting cocky, sending a large armoured column south from
Al Kut, either to take on US Marine forces on the roads or to push through and reinforce Nasariyah, which is holding out but may need some 'stiffening' to discourage Shia majority from having ideas. I think half of this large force will survive long enough in the open to reach the town - three quarters if they are only going to garrison in towns on the road north of Nasariyah. If their intention is to take on the marines, or if the marines position to intercept them, there will be a very large battle which the marines will win easily if they retreat to regroup: if they dont retreat, they won`t catch much of the Iraqi column [it will split up and go around them]. So from the Iraqi side the tactically sensible US fallback will be presented as a rout -- a purely political victory acheived at some cost. To split coalition airpower tasking, 150 Iraqi armoured vehicles rushed out of Basra to the south east. British troops there have little armour of their own [armour was deployed south-west and north of city to prevent a breakout that way]. If that Iraqi thrust is not hit by a lot of airpower, it may overrun and capture hundreds of British troops: the Iraqis are forcing coalition air assets to choose which attack to pay most attention to. Clever politically, because coalition has to choose whether to protect American or British troops. More likely than exclusive choice, they will put some airpower onto both targets, meaning a harder fight all round for coalition, and casualties. Iraqis must either be confident of their political control of Basra or reckless of it to send so many well-equipped troops out of the city on what could easily be a doomed mission.

NAJAF/MEDINA DIVISION
US armoured advance on the southern approach to Baghdad appears to have stalled at Najaf. US announcements of a change in tactics -- attacking the fedayeen/tribal forces which are cutting the roads -- effectively means pulling some armoured units back down the road to secure it.
Fine on the face of it -- but I`m always suspicious when somebody announces their tactics: US has been bombing the Medina division south of Baghdad for two days now, and if their tanks have enough fuel and ammo they may well spring forward and take it on. They would have it routed in one or two days if they did. US forces would probably be very low on fuel, ammo and maintainance after that battle, but retain enough to defend in place until supplies and spare parts are driven and dropped in. Either way, the US armoured units need a day for the men to rest-up, and their infantry components have been very busy killing Iraqi infantry which have got in close during the sandstorm. Yanks need a victory badly and soon - inconcievable that they`re not working on one, inconcievable just now that it is to announce control of a major city: with a caveat on rebellion against Saddam. Nasariyah would be nice for them there. Desert roads north of Nasariyah would be a good second choice (lots of Iraqi tanks burning), defeat of Medina division would be the most effective for propaganda and would also be of military significance. Yesterday`s bad publicity bombing of Iraqi ballistic missile launchers in Baghdad implies imminent US ground operations close to the city, so argues for a strike on Medina republican guard units to the south.

PARACHUTE OPERATIONS - air, fire and water.
A new front, says Fox. Not Yet: the operation`s shareholder significance is more immediate. Thirty miles north-east of Irbil is nowhere near any Iraqi army, and not even particularly close to the Turkish army. Siezed airfield is very important for supplying the troops, but can`t be used as a strike airbase because the only supply link is by air. Also, any large buildup of American ground forces there is going to be fairly slow. 'Good sources' in Turkey say the Turkish army goes south in force if Kurds (and by implication, their American allies) take the cities of Mosul or Kirkuk -- another factor complicating a US move on these cities from the new bridgehead.

What`s up there then? The Bakhama and Dukan dams - The US landing is right between them. Other US special forces have been fighting for a week near Darbindakhan dam to the south-east: ostensibly against ricin-munching Osama-lovers. These forces can now be reinforced by road from the new air bridge. In a couple of weeks, US forces will have sluicegates controlling most of the flow of the Tigris: one more dam near the oil fields west of Dohuk and they control it all.
The Tigris is Baghdad`s river, and summer is approaching. Oil and water together, say the big picture analysts, is the unique strength of Iraq. US companies soon to control this strength? US will not openly cut the river`s flow rate this summer (too obscene for anyone nicer than Richard Perle), but may well use their control of the water to stress the importance of a resolution in parched Baghdad

There is a small but frightening possibility that one or more of the dams will be damaged during any fight for them.
An act of terror that can be plausibly blamed on Saddam and plausibly lead to an emergency reconstruction contract being awarded to a US consortium. Note that damamge to southern oil fields created percieved urgency to repair them -- nobody tendered: the US government just threw contracts to companies of their choice. What went for oil goes stronger for water, where urgency is real.

Bit 4 - Mon 24 March 2003
SHOCK AND AWE LAST TIME, NOW JUST CHOKING ON DUST: political aspects of two wars.
THEN:
In 1991 when Schwarzkopf threw all his troops into a turning left hook around southern Kuwait, he took all the coalition`s war objectives in two days. Half a million mechanized troops moved 200 kilometers north through open country, rapidly defeated Iraqi mechanized units in the way, then stopped on a predetermined line that blocked Iraqi units retreating from Kuwait. The Iraqi retreat became two enormous and vulnerable open road traffic jams, became the target of 3000 airstrikes over 30 hours, died. And that was the whole ground war - moving, overrun attacks, securing open ground, cutting and blocking roads, and maintaining the cordon that 200,000 Iraqi troops were bombed to death in. It was simple, brutal, and worked perfectly; it was the entire battle plan.

"Our objective is very, very simple. First we are going to cut it [the Iraqi occupation army] off, and then we are going to kill it."
---Colin Powell to the media; confident enough that the plan was both obvious and unthwartable to describe it before hostilities commenced.

Powell sent Schwarzkopf twice as many troops and aircraft as he needed to do the job they did, and it covered contingencies: Soviet intervention, the Iraqis holding Kuwait City rather than fleeing it, rebellion in Saudi Arabia. None of the contingencies eventuated; and it may not be too cynical to suggest that the size of the force sent [nearly half the US Army and Air Force] neutralized them as effectively as competent US diplomacy, UN backing, and the uncontestable illegality of Iraq`s position.

Nearly all of the political objectives of the 1991 campaign were secured before fighting commenced: Iraq isolated diplomatically, military assistance from 28 nations, copious basing and logistic priviledges for the buildup period, war finance from foreign governments, solid legal groundwork for postwar containment and disarmament. Military force was only needed to accomplish one political objective -- restoration of Kuwait`s government -- and to purely military objectives: destruction of Iraq`s warfighting and warmaking capability.

Compared to NOW:
Available coalition forces are half the 1991 number and air power is less than half, but the ground to be controlled is forty times larger. Forces will have to fight for much longer, control an unknown number of objectives (unknown to mission planners, not just the general public), and defeat or deter an unknow number of enemy military formations which may or may not be working together. The numerous unknows are a direct result of comprehensive -- almost complete -- failure to achieve pre-war political objectives:

Iraq is not diplomatically isolated; the core coalition nations are.

There are only three core coalition members with offensive land-fighting components, compared to ten in 1991.

Logistic and deployment restrictions on the coalition increased as war approached; with potentially catastrophic implications for the length, difficulty, and even success of military operations.

No external finance: cost of war will either come out of coalition pockets or, more likely, future Iraqi revenues.

No agreed legal framework for what is happening now or afterwards. Core coalition members will not not permit non-members to influence legal structure, economic development, or foreign security relationships of post-war Iraq.

This lack of political groundwork has forced coalition war planners to rely on bravura assumptions: that solutions will be found to existing problems as war progresses, that sheer determination will discourage resistance, that the enemy`s powerbase is shaky and will shake more as war progresses, that defections will occur; and most alarming of all, that the coalition alone can decide whether multiple adverseries will be dealt with sequentially or simultaneously. Furthermore, as specific successes in coalition building became more elusive and war approached, coalition diplomacy became merely rhetorical and could not be engaged. This continued until the war stared: what, for instance, were Iraqi decision makers to make of an ultimatum that Saddam must leave the country to avert war -- in the light of a nearly simultaneous statement that war would occur whether he left the country or not?

Now that the war is on, of course, the coalition armed forces are largely committed to achieving the objectives that the White House and Downing street have missed. Troops are raising flags and putting their dots on the map everywhere in the south of the country, and their considerable fighting power has been dispersed past the point of effectiveness in order to achieve this political objective. Iraqi surrenders and defections occurred in the face of the large fast mass of the initial advance out of Kuwait: that`s an armoured offensive in action. Now that the coalition forces have split into regimental or even smaller groups, they are less impressive -- the surrenders have stopped. Now, Iraqi boys in Nasariya wave their genitals from rooftops at the perplexed foreigners

Bit 3 - Sun 23 March 2003
NASARIYAH AND BASRA
Baghdad not on the bombing list last night, just a few strikes from aircraft hunting mobile phones. Media was exciting, nearly informative, in the first three days -- but moribund now. Journalists are either stuck in bases and cities or under reporting blackout with forward units. The ones showing initiative in the field must be having a hard time: three killed so far. John Simpson in Kurdistan has either gone to ground with the Kurds or been rounded up by US special forces.

Pentagon says 500 cruise missiles launched last night: where did they go? Where did the AF/Navy fighter bombers go? Same place probably. Reuters said Nasariyah liberated, rest of media picked it up and ran with it, but Franks didnt mention it in subsequent press briefing -- and wasn`t asked about it either. I thought that was way too quick for a battle, assumed hopefully that the defenders had just changed sides for reasons of personal gain. This morning`s news (Australian time) proclaims Basra and Nasariyah secured, and by midday say Basra is simply surrounded, and Nasariyah controlled. Nearly there, just another 24 hours: Iraqi 5th division in Nasariyah still fighting competently. Some US units have bypassed town and run up the Euphrates and northern roads. I`m still convinced the north road is the main thrust (with a partly political feint along the Euphrates), convinced too that Nasariyah was hit hard last night by airpower. Hit where the resisting troops were, wherever that may have been. US can`t just leave the defenders alone, even if they`re not doing anything - it would be the same as leaving an enemy army base just next to the bridges. US needs the town secured quickly, assuming they want the north road option, and will use whatever force they think they need. Town is on the north bank of river, but the east-west roads (and oil pipelines) are south: US can use that approach without having to take Nasariyah, but then will have to deal with even larger towns south of Baghdad...

Basra can wait a while, even though it nominally threatens the flank of the origin of the coalition`s advance. Fairly plain now that British troops are not racing north, so it`s Britain`s job to poke, probe and pick at Basra. Expect British armour is fairly well back, mainly around airport and to the south of town; in case Iraqi armour hidden in garages decides to charge and make hay out of american supply trucks. Brits will take their time, Yanks will try to hurry them. Tea versus coffee.

Umm Qasr still not 'safe': but then, safety is decided ultimately by political agreements, not military actions.

Bit 2 - Sat 22 March 2003
TAKING A GUESS - THE NEXT WEEKS OF U.S. ADVANCE; WHAT`S ALREADY HAPPENED

Four days in. US armoured forces are at the gates of Nasariyah, and a large battle is imminent there. Basra, in the east, has a reprieve -- it will only be bombed for now. The US advance is clearly committed to the Euphrates road, not the Tigris road. In the north of Iraq everything is fearsomely pear-shaped. The US must get some forces there quickly to 'protect' their new Kurdish allies against the imminent Turkish invasion, and to stop Kurdish fighters angered by the Turkish invasion from attempting to massacre Arab settlers in Mosul and Kirkuk just because they can get their hands on them (and just because they`re both Kurdish cities anyway). It needs about a division of troops, it needs them fast, and they`ll have to be parachuted in because Turkey is closed to military road traffic.

The US needs very quickly to get a north-south transit route through Iraq to assist and control the Kurds, to supply and protect any airborne troops, to get to Baghdad. So when they take Nasariyah they`ll turn north, fight or blast their way through some small towns on the road, then attack the larger town of Al Kut on the river Tigris. Once that`s done they have a fairly clear road westwards to Baghdad, plus the option of sending forces north towards Kurdistan. Bonus points for cutting the road between Baghdad and Tikrit, but more generally the strategic advantage of cutting Iraq almost exactly in half -- every major road across the country goes through or near Baghdad. By turning north after Nasariyah the US avoids large urban battles further west, and once they reach Al Kut they have blocked both of the main riverine highways to Iraqi use.

RETROANALYTIC GUESS:
UK Telegraph reported that Umm Qasr was under attack by special forces on day one. It`s still not secure, and this is day four. It`s a small town with a lot of nice warehouses and docks that the coalition needs so won`t have obliterated by bombing. It looks like Iraqis fight well when they think they have a chance of doing it on even terms. Terms of honour, that is -- Umm Qasr is only a few hundred metres from the Kuwait border and nobody defending it will have had the slightest illusion of fighting for victory. Stay tuned.

Bit 1
FUEL-AIR WEAPONS AND AN IRAQ WAR
Copyright Steven J Collier 19 March 2003 - May be quoted and reprinted as long as clear acknowledgment given and we are notified.

Effects and suitability of Enhanced Blast Effect Weapons in urban warfare

When American and British troops enter Iraq from Kuwait, they must seize the towns of Az Zubair and Basra to open the roads into new battlefields. Baghdad will not come to the invaders, and to assault or invest the city with any hope of victory, the invaders need good roads to bring up their supplies. Unless Iraqis can feed themselves during the war and subsequent (predicted) instability, military and non-military organizations will need to move millions of tons by road.

Two roads lead to Baghdad from the first battleground: one west through the shia towns of Nasariyah, Samawa, Najaf and Karbala; one north then west through the shia towns of Al Amara and Al Kut. Media attention is on what may happen in Baghdad, but the intervening towns may be important battlegrounds - Franks needs to take them quickly to get the roads open, Saddam needs delay and whatever attrition he can inflict on advancing forces: and his commanders will attempt these objectives from positions of cover.

US air components are numerically weak compared to the 1991 war, because of regional restrictions on basing rights: bases are also on average further away from the (expected) battlefields, which reduces the mission rate. It should be assumed that the Iraqis will be able to destroy most or all of their own airfields, and until they can be rebuilt there will be a shortage of runways. International relief efforts, troop rotation and strategic airlift will also produce air traffic to compete with military combat flying - US and British ground forces may find air support carefully rationed during the first weeks of advance.

US commanders will, as always, attempt to lessen the effects of mission constraints by choosing their ordnance carefully. The Iraqis are digging-in where they think the enemy`s objectives are -- the cities -- and daring the enemy to fight there. It`s their best tactic after what happened to them in 1991, but it`s a strategic necessity too: the Iraqi population is largely urban, and garrisoning cities will prevent them rebelling. So Iraqi commanders need to hold cities, while US commanders need to take at least a few of them very fast to clear the way to Baghdad. What weapons will they need to do this?

Cities are full of cover which reduces the attacker`s advantages: advance is dangerous even when methodical, and will fail if reckless. Defending forces may be a metre away and unseen. Attacking armoured units are vulnerable to flank, top and rear attack, mines and traps can be encountered inside buildings and on roads. Snipers may be anywhere. Attackers may use armoured bulldozers to destroy buildings of 2 storeys or less, to kill defenders in the buildings and create approaches into the city that the defender does not expect. The IDF used this technique in Jenin: but the defenders there had no heavy weapons to frustrate the attack, and the defenders in Iraq have artillery, mortars, rocket launchers and anti-tank guns.

Grozny
An explanation of Fuel-Air Explosives and Grozny 2000

Chechen defenders brought the 1994 assault on Grozny to a standstill, but were defeated in 1999. The precise and fairly widespread use of small fuel-air munitions played a considerable part in the Russian victory. Russian infantry destroyed Chechen strongpoints in Grozny with shoulder launched fuel-air bombs weighing 2 kg; Armoured units weighed in as needed with bigger ones. Infantry were close enough to targets to assess them, even shout to them. They were at least moderately aware of where civilians were with respect to their targets. With these [small] weapons available immediately at platoon level, Russian decision makers did not have to do as much of that peculiar moral calculus which trades the lives of civilians for the lives of troops.

There are no small fuel-air munitions in the US inventory, and in particular the US army does not have them in inventory at all: but the USAF and USN fleet air component have large stocks of them ranging from 200kg to 7000kg. These are immensely destructive weapons, and appear to have been used more widely in the recent conquest of Afghanistan than has been officially admitted.

The perfect technical suitability of these weapons for destroying urban resistance can be illustrated by this link and a little more discussion of the unique blast effects:

Note the aftermath carefully - the building has been crushed, despite being outside of the detonation cloud: but it has not been crushed preferentially in the direction away from the explosion! This is an effect of the volumetric nature of the detonation which is much stronger with a large weapon than a small one: large detonating volumes produce a thick shock zone, conventional 'point blast' detonations from normal ordnance only produce a shock front. In a travelling shockwave this zonal effect produces both sustained (rather than instantaneous) pressure, and pressure from multiple directions on objects in the shock zone. This tends strongly to make cover transparent to the blast effects. Example: a volumetric explosion near a bunker with one opening on the side opposite the explosion will still produce a blastwave into the bunker as the pressure zone passes over and behind it. Targets in the open are crushed from all directions by blast, targets with cover are subject to 'normal' blast from the directions of any breaks in cover. This effect is additional to seepage of the detonating medium, and the three effects together - seepage, overpressure duration and isotropic blast effect - produce extraordinary destruction. This is the only weapon in the US arsenal apart from nuclear and chemical that is as effective against dispersed covered targets as it is against open ones

So, the Soldiers don`t have these weapons - the pilots do. The soldiers need them, if there`s any lesson at all to be learned from Grozny. The soldiers are the only people in place to assess where the civilians are hiding (can`t do that from the air). The soldiers wont dare to be closer than 500 metres to anywhere the pilots drop theirs great monsters on, so won`t be able to assess where the civilians are (they`d have to reconnoiter 500 metres beyond the zones they were concerned by, too). The Air Force is under pressure to fly as much bang for the buck per mission as it can, and this is the planner`s weapon of choice for the expected combat environment: the campaign needs them. Bush is talking about 'shock and awe'. US military spokesmen are describing FAE bombs as Psychological Weapons (shock and awe). These weapons are not needed in open country where the Iraqis will not dare go in force - US/British 'fire and move' expertise and night vision technology will easily destroy them if they do. Quasi-official commentators, however, stress the use of these weapons in open country. US military spokesmen deny that new 'thermobaric' bombs are FAE weapons (new weapon = no reputation): and this is untrue.

EM pulse weapons will degrade and eventually destroy media feeds from cities not under allied control: and once the feeds are gone, everything happens in the dark.

SJC 19032003